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#2A-6/2/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, pro se 
BERNARD T. CALLAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated August 14, 1991,-1 we affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's (AKJ) dismissal-/ of these charges 
that Claudia S. Cockerill had filed against the Brentwood Union 
Free School District (District). 
Cockerill has filed papers with us purporting to be 
exceptions to that decision. Our Rules of Procedure, however, do 
not permit exceptions to decisions of the Board. Rather, parties 
may appeal our final orders to the courts, as Cockerill has 
done.-/ Moreover, we cannot consider Cockerill's exceptions 
even if we were to treat her papers as a motion to reopen or 
I;24 PERB 1(3021 (1991) . 
^24 PERB H4510 (1991). 
-''Cockerill's judicial appeal was dismissed by decision of 
the Supreme Court, Albany County, dated April 6, 1992. 
CASE NOS. U-97 08 
& U-10539 
Board - U-9708 & U-10539 -2 
reconsider our August 14 decision. Cockerill's exceptions are 
not based upon newly discovered evidence such as might warrant 
consideration of a motion to reopen or reconsider.-7 Her papers 
merely allege that certain factual and other errors were made in 
the decision to dismiss her charges. Her allegations in this 
respect do not support a motion to reopen or reconsider. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the exceptions to 
our August 14, 1991 decision in these matters and, alternatively, 
decline to reopen the record or reconsider that decision. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-'See County of Nassau, 18 PERB [^3076 (1985) (motion to 
reopen) and Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB J[3010 (1986) (motion to 
reconsider). 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MembOT 
//2B-6/2/92 
N STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUNKIRK PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS' 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 616, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11442 
CITY OF DUNKIRK, 
Respondent. 
TOWNE, RUBENSTEIN, SNYDER & POLOWY (Daniel R. Polowy of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL B. BLUTH, ESQ., for Respondent 
^ BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
J 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Dunkirk (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). The ALJ held after a hearing that the City violated §2 09-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
its Common Council unreasonably delayed a vote on ratification of 
a tentative contract negotiated with the Dunkirk Professional 
Firefighters' Association, Inc., Local 616 (Association). As a 
remedy for this violation, the ALJ ordered the City to implement 
the tentative agreement. 
The City argues that the ALJ's finding of violation is not 
supported by the record and that the remedy is contrary to the 
Act and public policy. The Association argues that the City's 
) exceptions are void because it did not have the Common Council's 
Board - U-11442 -2 
authorization to file them. The Association, however, otherwise 
supports the ALJ's decision and order. 
We consider first the Association's argument that we may not 
entertain the City's exceptions. Having been filed in accordance 
with our Rules of Procedure (Rules), the City's exceptions are 
properly before us. Whether the exceptions were filed with the 
appropriate authorizations is an issue affecting only the various 
branches and representatives of City government. Such internal 
disputes do not affect either our powers or our obligations under 
the Act and our Rules. 
The violation found by the ALT is premised upon the conduct 
of the Common Council, the City's legislative body. As the 
legislative body of a government cannot commit a refusal to 
bargain because it has no statutory right or duty to bargain,-'' 
we are faced immediately with an issue as to whether the charge 
even states a cause of action under §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. We 
hold that it does state a cognizable violation of the City's duty 
to bargain. Our reasons for that holding warrant explication 
because they place our disposition on the merits in proper 
context. 
The ALJ found, and the parties agree, that the Common 
Council was deliberating ratification of the tentative agreement, 
not legislative approval, as the latter is required by §2 01.12 of 
-/See, e.g., Niagara County Legislature and County of Niagara, 16 
PERB [^3 071 (1983) (history on appeal omitted) . 
Board - U-11442 -3 
the Act and as it is further referenced in §2 04-a.l of the Act. 
The significance of the differences between ratification and 
legislative approval,-x for purposes of holding that this charge 
sets forth an improper refusal to bargain, lies in the 
recognition that a ratification right belongs to the chief 
executive, not to the government's legislative body, and that 
ratification is a condition to a duty to execute, on demand, a 
contract which incorporates the agreements reached during 
negotiations. If the legislative body is chosen as the 
employer's ratifying entity, as is the case here, it serves 
merely as the chief executive officer's agent for purposes of 
meeting that condition. Therefore, the chief executive officer, 
who holds the right and duty to bargain under the Act, is 
responsible statutorily for the ratification process. We, 
accordingly, reach consideration of the AKJ's holding that the 
ratification was unreasonable delated, 
We agree with the AKJ's statement that ratification, being 
part of the bargaining process, is subject to the same standards 
of good faith as govern the bargaining itself. Reasonable 
expedition is no less expected in ratification than in 
bargaining, and that reasonableness is similarly judged by the 
totality of circumstances under the facts of each case. Here, 
the contract was concluded on November 16, 1989, ratified by the 
-
7See our recent decision in Board of Educ. of the City School 
Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 24 PERB [^3033 (1991) in this 
respect. 
Board - U-11442 -4 
Association on November 27, and rejected by the Common Council on 
February 20, 199 0. The Common Council held a number of meetings 
during this period in which it had the opportunity to, and did, 
discuss the contract.-'' Although the Common Council was entitled 
to a reasonable period for debate on ratification of the 
contract, after a careful review of the record, we find that the 
ALJ correctly found that the Common Council unreasonably delayed 
its vote. In reaching this conclusion, we are aware that the 
Common Council had questions about certain of the contract terms, 
that the respective parties' leadership was changing during this 
time, that the Common Council necessarily had other business to 
conduct, and that there was no specific timetable for 
ratification of the contract. Notwithstanding these 
considerations, we believe that the Common Council was in a 
position to take an informed vote on the contract sooner than it 
did. Although the Common Council did not simply ignore the 
Association's contract, it persisted needlessly in reviewing 
issues to which it either had an answer already or could have 
readily obtained an answer from the City's negotiators. Under 
such circumstances, the time taken to vote on this particular 
contract was excessive. 
Having affirmed the ALJ's finding of violation, we turn to 
the ALJ's order to implement the agreement, and in that respect, 
-'The ALJ found that the Common Council met twelve times during 
this period and considered the contract at five meetings. 
Board - U-11442 -5 
find that the order must be reversed. We considered the 
appropriate remedy in circumstances in which a reserved right of 
ratification has been waived in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of Buffalo-7 (hereafter Buffalo.) 
In that case, we refused to issue the very order issued by the 
AKJ in this case as being in excess of the Act's substantive law 
and our remedial powers under §205.5(d). The ALJ distinguished 
Buffalo on the basis of the City's misconduct in this case. Our 
remedial powers, however, are fixed by the Legislature. Those 
statutory powers cannot be expanded by the actions or inactions 
of any party. Consistent with the remedy we issued in Buffalo, 
the City can only be ordered to execute a document on demand 
incorporating the agreements reached between the parties on 
November 16, 1989. Whether any of the agreements set forth 
therein are subject to legislative approval and whether they are 
binding in whole or in part are not issues for our determination 
in the context of this improper practice charge because they 
concern only the enforceability of the document. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, we affirm 
the ALJ's finding that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
by unreasonably delaying a ratification vote, and deny the City's 
exceptions to that extent. We grant, however, such of the City's 
exceptions as are directed to the ALJ's remedial order. The 
Association's cross-exception is denied. 
^Supra note 2. 
Board - U-11442 -6 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City execute, upon the 
Association's demand, a document embodying the agreements reached 
by the parties on November 16, 19 89, and that it sign and post 
the attached notice at all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to employees in the Association's unit. 
DATED: June 2, 199 2 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the City of Dunkirk (City) in the unit 
represented by the Dunkirk Professional Firefighters' 
Association, Inc., Local 616 (Association) that the City will 
execute, upon the Association's demand, a document embodying the 
agreements reached by the City and the Association on 
November 16, 1989. 
CITY OF DUNKIRK 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME 
LOCAL 93 0 (ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY 
BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES), 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11624 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY/ 
Respondent. 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT LANE, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Erie County 
Water Authority (Authority) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ). After a four-day hearing, the ALJ held that the 
Authority had refused to bargain with AFSCME New York Council 66, 
AFSCME Local 930 (Erie County Water Authority Blue Collar 
Employees) (AFSCME) in violation of §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).-; Specifically, 
the ALJ held that there were no exceptional circumstances which 
warranted the Authority's refusal to negotiate with AFSCME unless 
-'The ALJ dismissed allegations that the Authority's refusal to 
negotiate violated §209-a.l(b) and (c) of the Act and no 
exceptions have been filed to those parts of the ALJ's decision. 
Board - U-11624 -2-
Frank Max, an AFSCME representative, and a former employee of the 
Authority,-'' was removed from AFSCME's negotiating team. 
The Authority argues in its exceptions that the ALT 
misinterpreted the controlling law, failed to consider certain of 
its points, and incorrectly limited the hearing and its proof. 
AFSCME supports the ALJ's finding of a violation, but it argues 
in cross-exceptions that the remedy should include a guaranteed 
retroactivity for any negotiated pay increase. 
The basic legal principles relevant to the disposition of 
this charge are well defined. In general, either party to a 
bargaining relationship may choose its own representatives and 
neither may attempt to control the other's selection. There is a 
recognized exception to this general rule, however, for those 
unusual circumstances in which a party's chosen representative 
poses a clear danger to the collective bargaining process.-7 
The exceptional circumstances test has otherwise been framed to 
require persuasive evidence that the presence of a particular 
individual would make good faith bargaining impossible.-7 
This case is the first in which we have been asked to apply 
these principles to an employer's refusal to bargain with a union 
-
7We recently affirmed another ALJ's dismissal of a charge 
alleging that Max had been discharged in violation of the Act. 
Erie County Water Auth. , 25 PERB ^3017 (1992) . 
^See City of Newburqh, 16 PERB 53081 (1986), and County of 
Nassau, 12 PERB ^3090 (1979), citing with approval General 
Electric Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 512, 71 LRRM 2418 (2d Cir. 1969). 
^KDEN Broadcasting Co., 93 LRRM 1022 (1976). 
Board - U-11624 -3-
because it has appointed a bargaining representative whom the 
employer considers to be objectionable. The Authority would have 
us determine whether Max posed a danger to negotiations from the 
totality of his conduct within and without the work place under 
all circumstances.-7 The Authority submits that Max has a 
history of personal animosity toward the Authority and its 
managers and -has exhibited a tendency to engage in physical 
assaults sufficient to permit the Authority to refuse to bargain 
with AFSCME so long as he remains a member of its negotiating 
team. AFSCME supports the ALJ's decision under which only Max's 
behavior as a labor representative or his conduct involving the 
Authority's negotiators is considered. 
The Authority's exceptions do not require us to define the 
outer limits of the evidence which might be admissible in defense 
of refusal to bargain allegations of this type. It is enough to 
hold that the approach adopted by the ALJ is too restrictive. 
In assessing the danger a given individual poses to the 
statutory bargaining process, something more than bargaining 
table misconduct or the individual's interaction with the other 
side's representatives may be relevant. In this case, for 
example, the ALJ rejected the Authority's proof of a workplace 
incident involving Max in which he allegedly threatened coworkers 
-The Authority submits that this is the approach taken under the 
National Labor Relations Act. In support of this contention, the 
Authority relies primarily on NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 182 
F.2d 810, 26 LRRM 2287 (6th Cir. 1950). 
Board - U-11624 -4-
with physical harm if they were to bid on a job with the 
Authority. We cannot say that a demonstrated propensity for 
violence at the workplace or for the threat of such violence is 
necessarily immaterial to the Authority's refusal to bargain with 
Max. Moreover, the ALJ's rulings and statements during the 
hearing reasonably may have dissuaded the Authority from seeking 
to introduce anything other than Max's conduct as a labor 
representative or the threats he allegedly made to the 
Authority's negotiators. Therefore, we grant such of the 
Authority's exceptions as allege that the ALJ incorrectly limited 
the hearing and excluded so much of the Authority's proof as 
would establish a propensity for violence and/or threats of 
violence in the workplace. As we cannot fairly assess the 
propriety of the Authority's refusal to bargain without such 
proof, it is necessary to reverse the ALJ's decision and to 
remand the case to the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ is to receive 
only evidence of Max's workplace misconduct to the date the 
Authority decided not to bargain with AFSCME and then only to the 
extent that Max's misconduct was known to the Authority's agents 
who decided not to bargain with AFSCME and was relied upon by 
them as a basis for their decision.-/ Max's conduct after the 
date of the Authority's decision or which was unknown to its 
decision-makers could not have influenced the Authority's 
-The evidence must be reasonably relevant to a claim of an 
arguable danger to the bargaining process. 
Board - U-11624 
-5-
decision not to bargain with Max and it is, therefore, 
immaterial. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, IT IS, 
THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ's decision and order is reversed 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings and decision as 
necessary 7/ 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
auMne R. Kmsel la , Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memlj 
Eric/T Schmertz, Membel 
-'We take notice from the contracts on file with us pursuant to 
§214.1 of our Rules of Procedure that the parties have negotiated 
a contract covering April 1, 1990 through March 31, 1992. 
Whether this intervening development renders the issues raised by 
the charge moot as between the parties is a matter which they 
should consider. 
#2D-6/2/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CARL E. CARTER, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12001 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 650, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer. 
) 
CARL E. CARTER, pro se 
SARGENT, REPKA & PINO (ROBERT HEFTKA and KEVIN STOCKER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (David F. Mix of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated October 8, 1991,-' we affirmed an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision dismissing Carl E. 
Carter's charge against the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 650 (AFSCME) which 
1724 PERB fl3040 (1991) . 
Board - U-12001 -2 
alleges that AFSCME breached its duty of fair representation in 
violation of §209-a. 2 (c)^; of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused to process a grievance on 
his behalf. 
Carter has filed an objection to our 1991 decision. Neither 
the Act nor our Rules of Procedure, however, permit objections to 
our decisions. Rather, appeals from our final orders may be 
filed with the courts pursuant to §213 of the Act. We have, 
however, under extraordinary circumstances, considered a party's 
request for reconsideration of a decision. In his objection, 
Carter merely alleges that certain of our findings are not 
supported by the record and that certain others are unclear. 
Such allegations do not support a motion for reconsideration. 
Having reviewed the record in this case, we are not persuaded 
that we have overlooked or misapprehended any material fact or 
misapplied any controlling principle of law in our original 
decision.-/ 
-
;Section 209-a.2(c) of the Act, added in 1990, codifies the 
union's duty of fair representation as developed through case 
law. 
-''Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB [^3010 (1986) . 
Board - U-12001 -3 
For these reasons, we de 
1991 decision in this matter 
reconsider that decision. SO 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
iy the objection to our October 8, 
nd, alternatively, decline to 
ORDERED. 
//2E-6/2/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, ILA, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12089 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
ASSOCIATION OF SURROGATES AND SUPREME 
COURT REPORTERS WITHIN THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12215 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
KAUFF, MCCLAIN & McGUIRE (BETH FALK of counsel), 
for New York State Supreme Court Officers Association, ILA, 
AFL-CIO 
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI (K. JANE FANKHANEL of counsel), for 
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters 
Within the City of New York 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (LEONARD R. KERSHAW of counsel), 
for State of New York - Unified Court System 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated September 6, 1991, the Assistant Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Board - U-12089 & U-12215 -2 
Director) held that the State of New York - Unified Court System 
(System) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused demands by the New York 
State Supreme Court Officers Association, ILA, AFL-CIO (Officers 
and the Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters 
Within the City of New York (Reporters) to negotiate the 
implementation of a lag payroll as required by §3 75 of Chapter 
190 of the Laws of 1990 (Section 375) A1 The System argues in 
its exceptions that the Assistant Director's decision must be 
reversed because §375 has been held by the United States Court o 
Appeals for the Second Circuit to be unconstitutional as 
-'Section 375 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision a 
of this section or of section 200 of the state 
finance law, commencing with the last bi-weekly 
payroll period ending at least fourteen days 
before March 31, 1991 for each nonjudicial 
officer or employee, the salary or wages of 
such officer or employee shall be payable by 
the state two weeks after they shall have 
become due. Until such time, an alternative 
procedure for the payment of salary and wages, 
to be determined by the comptroller, may be 
implemented in lieu of the procedure specified 
in subdivision 1 of such section 200 or in 
other provisions of law. The procedures set 
forth in this paragraph (including any 
alternative procedure determined by the 
comptroller) shall remain in effect until the 
state and an employee organization representing 
nonjudicial officers and employees who are in 
positions which are in collective negotiating 
units established pursuant to article 14 of the 
civil service law enter into an agreement 
providing otherwise for the payment of salaries 
and wages to such officers and employees. 
Board - U-12089 & U-12215 -3-
violative of the contract clause of the United States 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 10.-1 We agree. 
The Court's holding renders §375 void.-/ Therefore, that 
statute neither conferred a bargaining right upon the Officers 
and Reporters nor imposed a bargaining obligation upon the System 
at any time. The Court's finding of unconstitutionality 
precludes us from determining whether §375 required bargaining 
about the implementation of a lag payroll and from ordering any 
remedial relief. 
Based upon the finding of unconstitutionality of §375, IT IS 
ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, C] hairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membely 
Eric/tf. Schmertz, Member 
^Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within 
the City of New York v. State of New York, 940 F.2d 766, 24 PERB 
H7535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert, denied, U.S (1991). 
^Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within 
the City of New York v. State of New York, N.Y.2d , 
25 PERB [^7502 (January 16, 1992) ; 20 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Constitutional 
Law §83. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JO-ANN COSTABILE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12619 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
JO-ANN COSTABILE, p_ro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JOHN H. JURGENS Of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Jo-Ann 
Costabile to the dismissal of her charge against the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) which alleges a violation of §209-
a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissed the charge as untimely filed. 
Costabile's charge, filed on June 28, 1991, alleges that on 
September 19, 1990, the UFT represented Gloria Sonnenblum, 
another UFT bargaining unit employee, on a grievance which 
resulted in Sonnenblum's appointment to the position which 
Costabile was then holding. Costabile asserts that UFT 
represented Sonnenblum, to Costabile's ultimate detriment, 
without first having made an evaluation of the grievance as 
allegedly required by UFT's internal procedures. 
Board - U-12619 -2 
After she was removed from her position, Costabile filed a 
grievance herself, which was dismissed by an arbitrator's 
decision dated May 24, 1991. The arbitrator affirmed a lower 
step determination that the UFT was barred from pursuing 
Costabile's grievance by its earlier successful pursuit of 
Sonnenblum's grievance. 
The Director held that the four-month limitations period 
fixed by §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) ran from 
September 19, 199 0, because Costabile was harmed then by UFT's 
representation of Sonnenblum. The Director concluded, in 
essence, that the arbitration award on Costabile's grievance 
merely failed to reverse the harm, if any, done to her in 
September 1990, and that the award on her grievance did not 
provide a third point from which the four-month limitations 
period could begin. In dismissing the charge, the Director 
relied upon this Board's decisions in City of Oswego,-7 and 
Middle Country Teachers Association (Werner).-1 
In her exceptions, Costabile contends that her charge is 
timely because the four-month limitations period should properly 
run from the date she received the arbitration award denying her 
grievance. She again argues that the consequences of the UFT's 
alleged failure to follow its own procedures in evaluating 
Sonnenblum's grievance were not known until the arbitrator ruled 
1723 PERB 1(3007 (1990) . 
^21 PERB ^3012 (1988). 
Board - U-12619 -3 
in May 1991 that her grievance was barred because Sonnenblum's 
grievance had been granted. 
UFT raises certain procedural objections to Costabile's 
exceptions. It first argues that the exceptions are untimely 
because they were not filed within fifteen working days after 
Costabile's receipt of the Director's decision. Although the 
Director's decision is dated September 6, 1991, it was not mailed 
until September 9, 1991, and not received by Costabile until 
September 11, 1991. Her exceptions are postmarked October 1, 
1991, and, as such, they were filed within fifteen working days 
following receipt of the Director's decision, as required by our 
Rules. 
The UFT also contends that Costabile's exceptions should be 
dismissed because she failed to file the required number of 
copies of her exceptions. Costabile's failure to file the 
requisite number of copies of her exceptions, although not in 
compliance with §2 04.10(c) of our Rules, does not require 
dismissal of her exceptions, if otherwise timely and properly 
filed. The requirement of an original and four copies of 
exceptions is for the convenience of the Board and it does not 
implicate any party's substantive or procedural rights.-; 
Therefore, the exceptions may not be dismissed upon this ground. 
^Compare City of Albany, 23 PERB [^3027 (1990) , conf 'd. City of 
Albany v. Newman, 24 PERB ^7004 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1991), 
aff'd, A.D.2d , 25 PERB ^7002 (3d Dep't 1992). 
Board - U-12619 -4 
The UFT last alleges that Costabile failed to serve it with 
a copy of her exceptions and failed to submit proof of service of 
such copy to the Board as required by §204.10(c) of our Rules. 
In United Federation of Teachers (Thomas).-1 we held that a 
party's failure to timely serve a copy of exceptions upon all 
parties and to file with us proof of service of such copies 
requires dismissal of the exceptions upon motion of an affected 
party. -1 
Based upon the unrefuted assertion of the UFT that it was 
not served with a copy of Costabile's exceptions, Costabile's 
failure to file proof of service, and the UFT's motion to dismiss 
the exceptions, the exceptions must be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed for failure to comply with the service and filing 
requirements of §2 04.10(c) of the Board's Rules. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^15 PERB ^3030 (1982). 
-''See also Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 14 PERB 
H3075 (1981), and City of Albany, supra note 3. 
#2(3-6/2/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPEW POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11098 
VILLAGE OF DEPEW, 
Respondent. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MAHONEY, BERG & SARGENT (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
By decision dated February 25, 1992,-' this Board held that 
the Village of Depew (Village) violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it prohibited officers 
and members of the Depew Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(PBA) from conducting a particular fund raiser and threatened 
them with suspension from their jobs if the fund raiser were 
held. 
^Village of Depew, 25 PERB ^3009 (1992). 
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The Village has filed a motion to have us reconsider the 
decision on the ground that we misapprehended a material fact and 
misapplied the controlling law.-'' The motion must be denied. 
The material fact which the Village argues was 
misapprehended in the Board's earlier decision is that the 
purpose of the PBA's fund raiser was to raise money to assist a 
unit employee with the expenses he had incurred in the defense of 
disciplinary charges brought under Civil Service Law §75. 
However, our decision refers to those charges and the facts 
pertaining to the purpose of the fund raiser were clearly part of 
the record reviewed and considered by us. Our subsequent 
reference to a "grievance" was intended only to reflect that the 
PBA was assisting the unit employee with a job-related complaint. 
The Village's second argument in support of reconsideration 
is that the PBA was not required to hold a fund raiser for the 
unit employee and that its decision to do so is not protected. 
The issue in this case is not the PBA's duties, but its rights 
and the rights of the employees it represents. The PBA and the 
unit employees had a right protected by the Act to hold the fund 
raiser and the Village interfered with the exercise of that 
right. 
-'We have entertained motions for reconsideration on these 
grounds. See Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB [^3010 (1986) . 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Village's motion is 
denied. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^ ^ . J U O ^ t ' U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
A^uc^z^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, VILLAGE OF 
NEW PALTZ UNIT, LOCAL 85 6, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12082 
VILLAGE OF NEW PALTZ, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
J. PHILIP ZAND, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Village of New Paltz (Village) has filed exceptions to 
an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) determination that the 
Village violated §209-a.l(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by discharging James Noon, a unit employee, 
in retaliation for his statutorily protected activities on behalf 
of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Village of New Paltz Unit, Local 856 (CSEA). 
CSEA has filed cross-exceptions to the remedy ordered by the ALJ. 
The Village asserts that the ALJ's findings are not 
supported by a balanced reading of the record, that he relied 
incorrectly on hearsay testimony, and that he drew an 
Board - U-12082 -2 
inappropriate negative inference from the Village's failure to 
call Noon's former supervisor, Vincent Palermo, to testify. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the Village's 
exceptions, we find that the record fully supports the AKJ's 
findings in material respect and we affirm his decision. 
Noon's expressed interest in running for unit president, his 
communications to unit employees of CSEA meetings and his 
attendance at such meetings are undisputedly-7 protected 
activities. Palermo's awareness of these activities and his 
unhappiness with them is similarly uncontrovertible. Palermo, 
for example, threatened to see to it that Noon was terminated 
from his job within six or seven months should he run for union 
office. Although Noon thereafter decided not to run for unit 
president, he proceeded, within the time frame set forth in 
Palermo's threat, to lodge health and safety complaints with 
Palermo on behalf of CSEA. On the morning of July 24, 1990, he 
publicized the second CSEA meeting and had his second 
confrontation with Palermo regarding that communication. In the 
afternoon of July 24, two members of the Village Personnel 
Committee - Carole Smith and Thomas Nyquist, the Village's mayor -
met and approved Palermo's request for Noon's termination. On 
July 25, the Village Board passed a resolution terminating Noon, 
with Palermo present and providing input. Midday on July 27, 
-'See infra. 
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Noon was summarily notified of his discharge. It is undisputed 
that Noon's discharge was pursuant to Palermo's instigation and 
based upon his recommendation. There is no evidence that Noon 
was otherwise being considered for termination or any other 
disciplinary action by the Village, no evidence that the Village 
Board, which voted on Noon's termination, had reviewed his work 
record, and no evidence that any member of the Village Personnel 
Committee, which approved Palermo's recommendation for 
termination and forwarded it to the Village Board, did more than 
a cursory review of Noon's personnel file. Moreover, after Noon 
was discharged, Palermo admitted to Jean Shannon, a Village 
employee, that Noon had been terminated for his union 
activity.-7 This evidence alone would be sufficient to 
establish Noon's protected activity, Palermo's animus, and the 
causation necessary for the finding of a violation of the Act. 
The rest of the record only strengthens this determination. As 
explained hereafter, the Village's attempts in its exceptions and 
supporting brief to discredit or weaken various portions of the 
record and the ALJ's interpretation of it are not persuasive. 
The Village's reliance on Noon's allegedly mediocre job 
performance and spotty attendance, particularly regarding 
overtime assignments, is without merit. According to the 
-'After Shannon told Palermo that a discharge for such a reason 
was illegal, Palermo immediately changed the subject and did not 
refer to it again. 
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testimony of the Village's own witness, Garry Thomsen, who was 
one of Noon's supervisors, Noon's job performance was on a par 
with that of the other unit employees. Noon's attendance was of 
such minor concern to the Village that it prompted only one 
counselling session over a year prior to Noon's termination. 
Noon's requests for leave, sometimes submitted after the fact, 
were routinely approved, pursuant to Palermo's practice in the 
department. It strains credulity to conclude, as the Village 
would have us do, that it was suddenly overcome by Noon's work 
history to the point of having to summarily terminate his 
employment following one minor disciplinary action over a year 
before. The predominant activity described on this record in the 
months preceding Noon's termination was his union activity and 
his confrontations with Palermo regarding it. Noon's termination 
occurred within the time period stated in the threat Palermo made 
when Noon initiated his union activity and was considered within 
hours of, and occurred within a day of, a confrontation between 
Noon and Palermo regarding Noon's posting of a second CSEA 
meeting notice. 
The Village's argument that Palermo's actions and motive 
cannot redound to the Village's detriment is meritless. Palermo, 
as Noon's supervisor, acted as an agent of the Village. Because 
the Village terminated Noon at Palermo's instigation and on his 
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recommendation,-7 its termination proceeding and order were the 
direct result of Palermo's improper motive and were tainted as a 
result. -1 
The Village argues that Noon was never designated a CSEA 
shop steward and was not authorized to lodge health and safety 
complaints on CSEA's behalf. Although no formal CSEA vote was 
taken, and Noon was not formally designated a shop steward by 
CSEA, we find that Noon was acting as a shop steward, with the 
knowledge and consent of the majority of the unit employees, and 
that he proceeded to make health and safety complaints in the 
name of CSEA. Further, regardless of Noon's official status, 
there is no evidence that Palermo rejected Noon's representation 
that he was acting on CSEA's behalf. Under these circumstances, 
any action taken against him based on these complaints was 
unlawful under the Act.-7 
-''Smith testified on behalf of the Village regarding the 
process by which Noon was terminated. As found by the A.LJ, and 
contrary to the assertion of the Village in its brief, Smith's 
testimony is properly characterized as vague except in her 
description of Palermo as responsible for Noon's termination. 
ySee, e.g., County of Suffolk, 20 PERB ^3009, at 3018 (1987); 
Town of Gates, 15 PERB [^3079 (1982) ; Elmira City School Dist. , 
14 PERB H3015 (1981). 
-''Based on the above, we need not consider whether Noon's 
safety complaints would be otherwise protected. In that regard, 
see Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth. , 23 PERB }[3006 (1990) . Even if 
not protected, the rest of Noon's union related activities are 
sufficient to support our determination. 
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The Village's reliance on the relatively few incidents of 
alleged interference with Noon's statutory rights and on record 
evidence of goodwill within the department during Noon's employ 
is misplaced. Contrary to the Village's apparent belief, 
statutory liability is not necessarily defined by balancing union 
animus and improper motives against other circumstances in which 
the employer may have acted properly. An employer may have done 
nothing unlawful under the Act for the majority of an employee's 
employment, but that fact, even with some general evidence of 
departmental goodwill,-7 does not negate direct evidence, as we 
have here, of union animus and improper motive. This same 
analysis requires the rejection of the Village's reliance on its 
lack of interference with the first CSEA meeting,-7 with Noon's 
attendance at the two CSEA meetings or with Noon's presenting 
health and safety complaints. 
-'In noting the Village's contention in this respect, we do not 
suggest that there was overall goodwill in the department. The 
record references to goodwill are few and brief while Palermo's 
temper and oft-expressed displeasure at the mention of unions are 
well documented. That Palermo may have had a tendency to become 
angry with employees for reasons unrelated to union activities, as 
the Village suggests, merely demonstrates that other things angered 
him; it does not weaken the evidence of animus proven on this 
record. 
-
7In its brief, the Village notes that Thomsen, then a unit 
employee who was instrumental in scheduling the first CSEA meeting 
in April 1990 and who had earlier, tried to have the unit offices 
filled, was not discriminated against. While covered by the above 
analysis, we note also that the record does not indicate whether 
the Village had knowledge of these activities. 
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The Village also objects to the AKT's reliance on Shannon's 
alleged conjectural, hearsay testimony regarding Palermo's stated 
motive for Noon's discharge. Contrary to the Village's claim, 
Shannon's testimony was not conjecture, and, even if it qualifies 
as a hearsay statement, it is an exception to the hearsay rule as 
an admission against interest. Hearsay evidence, in any event, 
may be admitted in an administrative proceeding. It can be used 
to support a finding of violation otherwise premised, as here, on 
evidence acceptable in a court of law and it can even be the sole 
basis for an administrative determination.-'' 
The Village objects to the ALJ's reference to prior 
retaliation by Palermo in response, to a unit employee's safety 
complaint to his union representative, claiming that it is an 
"improper" example. To the contrary, Palermo's actions in 
considering an employee "guilty" who had complained to his 
bargaining agent about the safety of a truck in the department, 
in informing unit employees that they "would all suffer the 
consequences" if he did not learn the identity of the 
complainant, in seeking to learn the identity of the so-called 
guilty party, and in withdrawing the use of a microwave oven from 
unit employees until the guilty employee came forward are clear 
and uncontested, and demonstrate retaliation for the exercise of 
a statutorily protected right. Whether the guilty employee's 
J -xGray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741 (1988), and the cases cited 
therein. 
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subsequent job assignment was undesirable or punishment is 
immaterial given the evidence of Palermo's retaliatory conduct in 
handling the matter up to that point.-1 
Although the Village also complains about the ALJ's drawing 
of a negative inference from the failure to call Palermo as a 
witness,—/ the record evidence, without any negative inference, 
is conclusive in support of the ALJ's findings. 
Based on the above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
CSEA's cross-exception to the remedial order—7 is denied 
for the reasons set forth in our recent decision in County of 
Orleans.—/ 
-''Noon testified on direct examination that it was an 
undesirable assignment, but opined on cross-examination that it was 
not a punishment. 
The Village argues merely that the record lacks evidence that 
the employee considered the assignment to be punishment. The 
employee's subjective belief, however, is not dispositive. 
—''The Village asserts in its brief that there is no record 
evidence to support the ALJ's statement that Palermo still resided, 
at the time of the hearing, near the Village. However, Thomsen 
testified without contradiction that Palermo lives in a nearby town 
and travels through the Village regularly. 
It also argues that the ALJ should have concluded that Palermo 
would have been a hostile witness to the Village based on Palermo's 
resignation from the Village's employ since the at-issue incidents. 
The mere fact that Palermo resigned his employment is no basis upon 
which to presume hostility. 
—/CSEA seeks an order requiring the Village to give personal 
notice of the violation to each unit employee and to notify its 
supervisors of the unit employees' rights under the Act and to 
train them in that respect. 
^25 PERB [^3010 (1992) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village: 
1. Immediately offer James Noon reinstatement to his prior 
position with the Village; 
2. Make James Noon whole for any loss of pay or benefits 
suffered by reason of his discharge from the date 
thereof to the date of the unconditional offer of 
reinstatement, less any earnings derived from other 
employment obtained as the result of the discharge, 
with interest at the current maximum legal rate; 
3. Cease and desist from discriminating against James Noon 
for seeking union office, publicizing or attending 
\ 
/ , 
union meetings or serving as a union representative; 
4. Sign and conspicuously post notice in the form attached 
at all locations ordinarily used by the Village to 
communicate information to Village employees in CSEA's 
unit. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, < "chairperson 
Walter, L. Eisenberg, MembeT" 
Eric^o/Schmf q ff/Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify ^he employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Village of New' Paltz Unit, Local 856, that the Village of New 
Paltz (Village) will: 
1. Immediately offer James Noon reinstatement to 
his prior position with the Village; 
2. Make James Noon whole for any loss of pay or 
benefits suffered by reason of his discharge 
from the date thereof to the date of the 
unconditional offer of reinstatement, less 
any earnings derived from other employment 
obtained as the result of the discharge, with 
interest at the current maximum legal rate; 
3. Not discriminate against James Noon for 
seeking union office, publicizing or 
attending union meetings or serving as a 
union representative. 
VILLAGE OF NEW. PALTZ. 
Dated By • • • • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//3A-6/2/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BERNE-KNOX-WESTERLO TEACHERS SUPPORT STAFF, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3837 
BERNE-KNOX-WESTERLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Berne-Knox Westerlo Teachers 
Support Staff, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teacher Aides 
Excluded: All others. 
Certification - C-3837 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Berne-Knox-Westerlo 
Teachers Support Staff, NYSUT. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
M^^ki^lu, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
(jcMc^ r. 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
E r i c J y ^ c h m e r t z , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 424, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3884 
WEST ISLIP UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,-7 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
A secret mail ballot election was held on February 27, 1992. 
Of the 121 eligible voters, 31 votes were cast for Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., 1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) 
and 7 6 votes were cast for United Industry Workers, Local 
424. In addition, one vote was cast against both 
participating employee organizations and three ballots were 
challenged, bringing the total of votes cast to 111. 
On March 4, 1992, the CSEA filed objections to conduct 
allegedly affecting the outcome of the election; however, on 
April 30, 1992, the objections were withdrawn. 
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IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED, that United Industry Workers, Local 
424, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All cooks, assistant cooks, food service 
custodians, maintenance personnel, head and 
special custodians, driver messengers, bus 
dispatchers, and bus drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with United Industry Workers, Local 
424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any other 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June , 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline Kinsella, Chairperson 
Waltep-L. Eisenberg, Member 
i c y. Er  J< Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLETOWN ENLARGED CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3901 
-and-
MIDDLETOWN PART-TIME FOOD SERVICE 
HELPERS AND LEAD PERSONS ASSOCIATION, 
MIDDLETOWN COOK AND COOK MANAGERS UNIT, 
MIDDLETOWN HOME SCHOOL LIAISON UNIT. 
MIDDLETOWN FULL-TIME MONITORS UNIT,!7 
UNION OF MIDDLETOWN SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES, NYSUT, 
Intervenors. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Union of Middletown School 
Employees, NYSUT has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the units 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
All of the foregoing, the representatives of the units which 
are here consolidated, have disclaimed any further 
representation interest among the public employees in their 
respective units. 
Certification - C-3901 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit I: 
Included: Liaison, Aides and Monitors Unit consisting of regular 
part-time teacher aides working not more than 19 3/4 
hours per week, regular monitors and regular full-time 
Home School Liaison; 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit II: 
Included: Food Service Workers Unit consisting of regular full-
time Cooks, regular full-time Cook Managers, regular 
part-time Food Service Helpers working not more than 
19 3/4 hours per week and regular part-time lead 
persons working not more than 19 3/4 hours per week; 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Union of Middletown School 
Employees, NYSUT. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 2, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chai rperson 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member 
